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I. Preface 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
Report on the situation in EL Salvador 
The European Parliament has commented a number of times, and occasionally con-
troversially, on the situation in Central America and in EL Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Guatemala and Grenada in particular. Since 1979 these discussions 
have resulted in a number of parliamentary initiatives, resolutions and reports • 
Numerous Group and parliamentary delegations have visited the region. 
In the Light of the international repercussions of the crises in the region and 
the differences of opinion in the European Parliament, the Political Affairs 
Committee decided on 27/28 October 1981 to draw up a report on the situation in 
EL Salvador; on 24/25 May 1983 it broadened the scope of this report to include 
the whole situation in Central America. The rapporteur was authorized to visit 
Venezuela, EL Salvador and Mexico (26 October to 4 November 1982) to gain on-
the-spot information, assessments, opinions on the situation and outlook in 
EL Salvador. Further information was gathered during a visit of a European 
Parliament delegation from 6 January to 13 January 1984 in response to an invi-
tation to its Political Affairs Committee by the Governments of Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Costa Rica and EL Salvador. The rapporteur Lost no opportunity for 
talks with Leading politicians from the government and opposition and represent-
atives of the church and social groups. 
The comments and conclusions in this report take account of all the information 
and documents and accounts of their visit by Members of the European Parliament 
available, in particular the resolutions adopted in relation to the abovementioned 
reports. 
II. Objectives 
The aim of this report is to provide better information, indicate criteria and 
provide a basis for possible solutions to the problems, particularly in relation 
to : 
-the search for peaceful, political solutions to the tensions and conflicts 
which exist, 
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- the problem of respect for human rights, 
- humanitarian aid, 
- the development of pluralist, democratic structures by free elections, 
- the role of the European Community in Central America and the scope for 
greater economic and development cooperation. 
III. Introduction 
In many respects, EL Salvador has become the interface not only of the North-
South but also of the East-West conflict. At the end of 1982 and during 1983 
there has been a dramatic shift in emphasis in the region. 
In EL Salvador, the moderate democratic forces in government, the political 
parties and the armed forces are still in danger of being crushed between mili-
tant extreme right-wing groups both inside and outside government and a Marxist/ 
Leninist dominated guerrilla force. 
The ruthlessness of all those involved in the struggle has cost the Lives of over 
40,000 civilians since 1979. It is ruining the infrastructure and the economic 
foundations of the country. The reforms which were introduced have been repeat-
edly undermined. 
'Today EL Salvador, which is allied with Guatemala and Honduras, enjoys good 
relations with neutral Costa Rica and Panama and receives political, economic and 
military aid from the USA, has entered the conflict against Sandinist Nicaragua 
which -with Cuban backing- has assumed the role of a destabilizing Marxist/ 
Leninist force in the region. Since 1982 tension has been steadily growing 
between Nicaragua- which is still backing the Left-wing guerrillas of El 
Salvador- and its neighbours Honduras and Costa Rica.' 
An ideological conflict, which Europeans often see in very black-and-white terms 
and occasionally exacerbate, is being fought out in this region at the expense of 
a people suffering from economic crisis, social problems and the misery of refugees. 
The European Community must be concerned to find a swift, peaceful solution to 
the tensions in Central America and the Caribbean. Every trouble-spot, in which 
the interests of the super-powers are involved, threatens the precarious balance 
of world peace. The concern to prevent any expansion of the countless conflicts 
on the narrow isthmus between the two American continents has, after a number of 
attempts, Led Columbia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela to embark on a peace plan 
supported by all Central American states and the USA, the CO~TADORA initiative, 
to seek a new approach to peace in the region. 
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The European Community should, therefore, support all proposals for peaceful 
development while strictly respecting the sovereignty and without interfering 
in the internal affairs of countries in this region, and as part of a compre-
hensive economic and development policy, help to create the conditions which 
will lead to a general respect for human rights, eliminate the misery of ref-
ugees, and ensure political pluralism, social progress and improve economic 
and trade opportunities on the world markets. The European Parliament has 
undertaken to play a greater role in trade relations with Central America • 
IV. The position of El Salvador in the conflict in Central America 
In order to appreciate the origins of the conflict in Central America, it is 
essential to understand the key role which El Salvador played- and is still 
playing. 
El Salvador, which has been independent since 1821 and until 1849 formed part 
of the Central American Federation with Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, enjoyed a period of relative peace and prosperity in the 19th cen-
tury. The backbone of its economy was the coffee plantations introduced in 
1860, which along with sugar and cotton, today still account for the bulk of 
agricultural production. 
Social tensions led in 1932 to an uprising by farmworkers which was put down 
by the army. Since then the country has been governed by military regimes 
allied with the upper class which consists chiefly of the large landowners. 
These normally consolidated their position by holding sham elections. 
In 1972, on a joint opposition list, the chairman of the Christian Democrats -
Partido Democrata Cristiano (PDC) - and mayor of the capital San Salvador, 
Jose Napoleon Duarte, on the platform of comprehensive social reform was elected 
president, and the head of the small Social Democratic 'Movimiento Nacional 
Revolucionario <MNR), Manuel G. Ungo, was elected vice-president. The army 
manipulated the election results to the benefit of their own candidates. A 
countercoup failed and Duarte, arrested and tortured, went with Ungo and others 
into exile in Venezuela. 
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The social tensions, above all among the rural population and on the fringes of 
the towns continued to grow. In close collaboration with the Frente Sandinista 
de La Liberaci6n (FSLN) which was operating successfully against the Somoza 
regime in Nicaragua, the guerrilla movements which had been in existence in 
EL Salvador for some time and which had combined in 1980 to form the Frente 
Farabundo Marti para La Liberaci6n National (FMLN) gained ground. The situa-
tion was made even worse by the ordering home of hundreds of thousands of 
Salvadoreans working in Honduras and this was the main cause of the war which 
broke out between the two neighbouring countries in 1969. 
On 15 October 1979 a 'revolutionary government junta' consisting of young officers 
headed by Colonel Adolfo Majano and civilians including the Social Democrat Ungo~ 
returned from exile, took over power in a coup against the dictator General 
Romero. Initially the junta with its social economic reform programme enjoyed 
considerable support among the population and social groups but was unable or 
unwilling to prevent the further growth of the FMLN guerrilla movement or its 
predecessor CR-PM. 
The government collapsed at the beginning of 1980. Ungo, whose MNR had become a 
member of the Socialist International (SI) in 1978, went into exile in Mexico 
accompanied by some Christian Democrats who at a PDC congress at the beginning 
of 1980 had been defeated in a vote on a pact with the armed forces. Ungo 
became head of the political bureau of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario 
(FDR)r an association comprising a Large number of Left-wing parties, organ-
izations and groups among which the Communist Party is numerically by far the 
strongest. Ungo, the former Christian Democrat Zamora, Oqueli and others 
organized the revolutionary opposition and together with the SI directed the 
attention of world public opinion to the situation in EL Salvador. 
The FDR as the 'political wing' and the FMLN guerrillas as the 'military wing' 
of the resistance were now working together openly on a formal basis. In the 
FMLN too, Communists of various tendencies assumed the Leading role among the 
'commandantes'. The Secretary-General of the PCS Shafik Jorge Handal, also 
head of the 'Fuerzas Armadas para Liberaci6n Nacional' (FALN) was clearly able 
to consolidate his position in the FMLN five-man Leadership following the death 
of the popular former Communist and Leader Cayetano Carpio 1 ~ head of the 
1s. Cayetano Carpio committed suicide in the middle of April 1983 under mys-
terious circumstances after his deputy, Melinda Anaya Moutes (Comandante Ana 
Moria) had been murdered, according to the Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior, 
Tomas Barge, by members of her own FPL guerrilla Leadership. 
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'Fuerzas Populares de Liberaci6n' (FPL). This revolutionary opposition openly 
declared civil war although their policies (destruction of the feudal oligar-
chic structures, reforms, more democracy) offered no alternatives to government 
policy. 
The new junta, based on an alliance between the Christian Democrats and moderate 
leaders of the armed forces, which was in power until the elections on 
28 March 1982, embarked on a comprehensive programme of reform (agricultural 
reform, nationalization of banks and foreign trade). It was determined to 
fight the guerrillas without however ruling out a political solution through 
negotiations with the FOR. 
Napoleon Duarte took over as head of the junta in December 1980. In his state-
ment of government policy, Duarte Laid stress on the need for internal peace, 
.implementation of reforms respect for human rights and the gradual elimination 
of the state of emergency and announced free, internationally supervised elec-
tions to a constituent assembly in March 1982. 
2. The elections of 28 March 1982 
---------------------r--~-----
The elections announced in the policy speech of December 1980 of 60 members of 
a constituent assembly took place on 28 March 1982. 
While the opposition FDR/FMLN described the elections as a farce and called on 
the people to boycott the elections, six parties took part. These were the 
Christian Democrats <PDC), the Partido de Conciliaci6n Nacional <PCN), the 
traditional populist government party of the oligarchy, the Alianza Republicana 
Nacionalista (ARENA) headed by the ex-major of the intelligence services, 
D'Aubuisson, who is alleged to have close Links with the death squads, the 
Liberal-Conservative Partido Acci6n Democratica (AD) and two minority parties. 
~~~m the very outset the elections were accompanied by major international con-
troversy. The likelihood of free elections actually being held was judged 
sceptically by the Socialist International because of the risk to the candidates 
and the boycott by the left-wing opposition. The SI sent no official dele-
gation of observers. 
By contrast, the elections were supported by the vast majority of the Latin 
American Members of the Organization of American States (OAS), except Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Grenada and Cuba, the USA and the leading Latin American Christian 
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Socialist and Social-Democratic trade union movements, CLAT and ORIT, who sent 
observers. The church also backed the elections. 
The vast majority of the observers considered that the outcome of the elections, 
with a turnout of approximately 80% of the population despite intimidation by 
the opposition and armed attacks on the polling day was a demonstration against 
violence and in favour of the process of democratization and peace. 
The outcome of the elections however failed to resolve the ambiguous political 
situation in the country. Although the Christian-Democrats, with some 41% of 
the votes cast and 24 seats, became by far the strongest political force in 
the country, a right wing majority formed consisting of ARENA <29% of the vote 
and 18 seats) and the PCN <18% of the vote and 14 seats). The moderate AD 
remained a negligible force with only 2 seats. Major D'Aubuisson was appointed 
president of the assembly. Massive internal and external political pressure 
succeeded in preventing a sharp swing to the right which the government had 
been expected to make and thus the risk of a roll-back of the reforms. The 
neutral technocrat, Magana, was elected president, and the Christian-Democrats 
accepted a role in government to act as a counterweight to ARENA. The all-
party 'Pact of Apaneca• <August 1982) ensured that the reforms would continue 
and put an end to the constant threat of a military take-over. 
The constituent assembly in which the Christian-Democrats, the AD and part of 
the PCN formed a new and precarious majority adopted in December 1983 a draft 
constitution and fixed the presidential elections for 25 March 1984. The Right 
succeeded nevertheless in clearly reducing the scope of the agricultural re-
forms introduced by Duarte. 
The revolutionary opposition FDR/FMLN lack the broad popular support without whi~h 
lhey cannot hope to win. But the armed forces and government too are beginning 
to doubt whether a military victory is possible despite increased aid from the 
United States and although they enjoy a clear strategic advantage. 
According to various estimates some 30,000 soldiers face at least 5 to 6,000 
guerrillas. The FMLN based in Managua are supported by propaganda and military 
aid from the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The guerrillas are said to be well-
trained and their political/military Leaders, the •commandantes•, maintain 
strict discipline despite some conflicts within the FMLN leadership. 
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All major offensives by the armed opposition have failed. Their worst military 
setback was the collapse of the much publicised 'final offensive' of January 
1981. They are, however, operating with a degree of success from secure bases, 
particularly in the impenetrable areas along the Honduran border (Chalatenango, 
Cabanas, Morazan) and with their flexible, fast-moving tactics have inflicted 
considerable damage on the economy and infrastructure of the country. Their 
strategy is to divide the country in particular by isolating the western 
provinces. 
The core of the policies of Duarte's Junta from the very beginning was a policy 
of reforms which they saw as the only way to achieve social justice by parti-
cipation, to pave the way for democracy and to remove support for a violent 
revolutionary solution to the country's problems. 
The main measure was the agricultural reform ushered in by Decree No. 153 of 
5 March 1980 which provided in a number of stages for the transfer of all agri-
cultural areas exceeding j00 tG 150 ha irrespective of how they were being 
used into a cooperative system (Cooperativa agricola> 1 To support this reform, 
the banks and foreign trade were nationalized as both areas were controlled 
by the '14 families' of large landowners. 
The agricultural reform was often pushed through by force by the military. 
The first phase of the reform for cultivated areas over 500 ha is now complete. 
The economic situation has further deteriorated and is in a state of crisis. 
The GNP has fallen by 25% since 1978. 
The sorry state of human rights in El Salvador is shown in the reports by 
Amnesty International, the American Congress, the OAS Human Rights Commission 
and the church. It is estimated that there have been approximately 40,000 
civilian deaths since 1979, and many witnesses have given evidence of missing 
persons, refugees, cases of illegal imprisonment and torture. 120 Christian-
1
rn the new constitution the threshold was set at 250 hectares. 
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Democrat mayors have been assassinated. The attribution of guilt, however, 
varies considerably according to political viewpoint. Whereas the represent-
atives of the Salvadorean Human Rights Commission in Mexico which cooperates 
with the FDR/FMLN blame the army and security forces for some 85% of the 
offences, this is denied by the government, the political parties and army 
actually in the country itself, particularly since the FMLN refuses to allow 
investigations in the areas under its control. There are reports that people 
have been 'executed' there too. Within the FMLN itself there have also been 
bloody conflicts. 
The truth in this complicated situation would appear to be something along the 
following Lines; 
The army is trying to respect human rights, especially since supreme command 
passed from Garcia to Vides. At the same time the organization of command is 
inadequate to instil obedience in the paramilitary units which are only tech-
nically subject to the general command. 
-A Large number of innocent by-standers are killed in battles between the 
guerrillas and the armed forces in the conflict zones. The extreme right-
wing are still operating death squads. 
-Several thousand roaming armed men and an almost unlimited arms market are 
impossible to control. 
- The Legal system suffers from an outdated trial procedure and is subject 
to heavy political pressure and the threat of Left or right-wing reprisals. 
The Human Rights Commission set up by the government is not sufficiently 
effective. 
The 250,000 and more refugees from the conflict zones within the country and 
from the border regions of neighbouring countries increase the general climate 
of insecurity. 
There has been no shortage of attempts to arrive at a peaceful political sol-
ution since 1979. Both sides have taken part although tactical subterfuges 
have often concealed real intentions. Thus for example a peace plan presented 
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~Y the FDR/FMLN at the beginning of 1981 turned out to be a pretext to gain 
time to stabilize weakened military positions. The negotiations arranged by 
Mr Stone, the US special envoy in October 1983 in Bogota in response to the 
offer made by Ungo at the end of October 1982 to embark on negotiations 'without 
preconditions' ended with both sides trading insults. 
Nevertheless there is a willingness in EL Salvador except at government level 
~nd among the extreme right wing, notwithstanding considerable scepticism, to 
continue negotiations. The official church favours talks and has offered to 
act as an intermediary. 
These differing standpoints reveal the two crucial issues in talks with the 
FDR/FMLN : 
all political groups in El Salvador reject Left-wing opposition participation 
in government without prior elections. The opposition in exile, however, 
is clearly seeking participation in government as a result of negotiations, 
not elections, in which it would stand Little chance; 
- it is not known how the guerrilla forces could be re-integrated if there 
were an amnesty, particularly as the FMLN Comandantes have a strong position, 
some would say too strong, vis-a-vis Ungo and the FDR Council and adhere to 
the idea of a 'people's army'. 
A fruitful political dialogue between the government, the armed forces and the 
I 
parties represented in the constituent assembly on the one hand and the revol-
utionary opposition on the other hand, would seem possible, however, only if 
armed confrontation ends. 
The elections scheduled for 25 March 1984 could be a decisive step towards 
furthering the process of democratization, and a defeat of the extremists could 
Pnd the sufferings of the people, who bear the brunt of the political conflict. 
V. New conflicts 
Other flashpoints have emerged more clearly or become stabilized in recent years. 
Many developments in El Salvador cannot be understood without this background. 
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1. Cuba 
' 
Despite some sympathy for the original Cuban revolution, Cuba is generally seen 
as a troublemaker and close ally of the Soviet Union operating according to 
Marxist/Leninist rules. Cuba used to be a flourishing and prosperous island 
owing to its sugar although it was dominated by large landowners and great 
social misery prevailed; it now is under the spartan regime of a socialist 
country with a new leading elite which allows itself privileges it condemns 
in others and does not tolerate opposition. 
It is true that there has been some social progress for the broad mass of the 
population. This applies in particular to the system of education, medical 
care and agriculture. A heavy price has been exacted by the revolution : there 
is no longer any political or trades union opposition, the church is oppressed, 
two million out of a population of 12 million inhabitants are living in exile 
while tens of thousands are detained as 'terrorists' in Cuban prisons. Cuba 
is also a major Russian military base and receives high levels of aid from the 
Soviet Union. 
There is disagreement as to the extent to which Cuba is seeking hegemony but 
there is no doubt that it has been giving 'revolutionary' support to various 
countries in Latin America, Central America <Nicaragua) and African countries 
both in the form of arms and in the form of soldiers, development workers, 
doctors, teachers, civil servants, etc. In its triple role as Marxist state, 
successful dictatorship in a developing country and ally of the non-aligned 
states, Cuba has become a dangerous presence in the Communist camp and various 
national liberation organizations; however, this has led some states (El 
Salvador, Grenada) to mistrust Cuba. 
There can be no doubt that the destabilizing role played by Cuba in Central 
America and Caribbean. After the loss of Grenada as a Launching pad in the 
Cari~bean, the distancing of Surinam from Cuba and the more active presence 
of the United States in Central America, in particular in Honduras, Castro 
seems to be pursuing a more moderate line. This seems to be the import of 
Cuban statements to the effect that Nicaragua cannot count on active military 
aid in case of an invasion by the United States. 
Cuba is in favour of closer cooperation with the EEC, possibly in the hope 
that it will serve as an intermediary with the USA. The problematic dependence 
of Cuba on the Soviet Union is clearly viewed in a more critical light than 
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~reviously. The possibility of an economic opening to the detested and admired 
giant in the north, the United States, is probably also viewed positively. 
Nicaragua has 2.7 million inhabitants and a territory of 139,000 sq. kms. making 
it the largest of the five Central American countries by area but the smallest 
by number of inhabitants1; it lies between the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean 
and has borders to the north-west with Honduras and the south with Costa Rica. 
The history of Nicaragua has been dominated externally by powerful North American 
economic interests and domestically by the struggle between Conservatives and 
Liberals; it was occupied from 1910 to 1925 by the United States. In 1929 the 
Liberals -and with them, the Somoza family- came to power; they ruled and 
exploited the country like a private estate either directly or through the 
intermediary of men of straw, confirmed in sham elections and controlled it by 
means of a national guard of approximately 15,000 men. Some SO% of the work-
force is engaged in agriculture and in 1976 approximately two-thirds of the 
working population were unemployed while 40% of the population were illiterate. 
(b) Resistance to Somoza 
--------------------
After the human rights situation in particular had drastically deteriorated under 
President General Anastasio Somoza <1967-1979) the struggle for liberation of 
the people of Nicaragua gained increasing world recognition, not least thanks to 
the Standing Commission on Human Rights (Comision Permanente de Derechos 
Humanos - CPDH) headed by Jose Esteban Gonzales. The democratic parties, trades 
unions and the Catholic church and nearly all social groups took part in this 
struggle. The struggle against Somoza was supported in the Press by the daily, 
L'1 °r:nsa, which was frequently banned and the editor of which, Petro J. Chamorro, 
was murdered at the beginning of 1979 by Somoza's state security police. 
The Frente Sandinista de la Liberaci6n Nacional (FSLN) played a key role in the 
struggle against Somoza; it claimed to be the political child of Augusto Sandino, 
who was both a freedom fighter of the 1930s, anti-American and fiercly anti-
~ 
communist, though the Leadership veered at an early stage towards Marxist/Leninism. 
1Excluding Belize, previously British Honduras 
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Even before the overthrow of Somoza the FSLN had become assimilated to the 
Central American 'movements of liberation' ideologically dependent on and 
militarily supported by Fidel Castro's Cuba which in 1980 included the Frente 
Farabundo Marti para la Liberaci6n Nacional (FMLN) comprising the left-wing 
revolutionary guerrillas of El Salvador. 
The overthrow of the dictator Anastasio Somoza in July 1979 met with unanimous 
approbation all over the world. The new government which began with a consid-
erable stock of good will, received not only moral support but also massive 
economic and development aid from the United States, the European Community and 
its Member States. From 1980 to 1982 the EEC gave Nicaragua more aid than to 
all the other Central American states together. 
The FSLN solemnly undertook to respect three essentials - democracy, pluralism 
and a mixed economy. This undertaking was not kept. 
Today the FSLN with the aid of the 'Sandinista People's Army' (Ejercito Popular 
Sandinista) which was relatively well armed at a very early stage, the tight 
monitoring system of the Sandinista Defence Committee (CDS) and 'basis organ-
izations', exercises total control over the state and political and social Life. 
Officially, executive power lies with a three-member ruling junta and the 
Council of Ministers while Legislative authority lies with a state Council 
(Consejo de Estado), appointed as a Parliament, where the Sandinistas enjoy a 
majority of three-quarters. In fact, decisions are made by the Sandinista 
'Direcci6n Nacional' of the nine 'Comandantes de La Revoluci6n' which, since its 
inception, has been controlled by a core of five - the coordinator of the junta, 
Daniel Ortega, his brother, the Minister of Defence Humberto Ortega, Tomas Barge 
the Minister of the Interior, Sergio Ramirez a member of the junta, and the 
President of the Council of State, Carlos Nunez. The ultimate adoption of 
Marxist/Leninism as official ideology has been evidenced by many statements 
despite all denials 1• 
1
•sandinism is the source of our moral and political strength and Marxism/Leninism 
is our doctrine' stated Humberto Ortega in 'La principal tarea del pueblo es 
prepararse militarmente para defender su poder', Secci6n de Formaci6n Politica 
y Cultural del Ejercito Popular Sandinista, Managua 1981, Page 9. 
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Many former comrades-in-arms of the Sandinistas who called on the regime to 
honour its commitments to introduce democracy and pluralism joined a steadily 
increasing stream of refugees in exile including a member of the second junta, 
the social democrat Alfonso Robelo; the Deputy Minister of Defence, Eden 
Pastora <'Comandante Zero') who had led the attack on the Presidential palace 
in 1979 and so ushered in the end of the Somoza dictatorship; the President 
of the Commission on Human Rights CPDH, Jose Esteban Gonzales and many others. 
At the beginning of 1983 Robelo and Pastora decided to launch an armed struggle 
against the Sandinista regime with several thousand men; Esteban preferred to 
found a non-violent opposition in exile. Unlike the Frente Democratico 
Nicaraguense <FDN>, a force of eight to ten thousand men cooperating with former 
soldiers with Somoza's National Guard and operating from Honduras with financial 
support from the USA, the armed opposition movement of Robelo and Pastora has 
received only limited foreign aid1• In 1983 the non-violent democratic oppo-
sition remaining in the country formed the 'Coordinadora Democratica• 2 in the 
hope that by closing ranks it would be better able to exploit the steadily 
shrinking political leeway permitted by the 'Frente Patri6tico' under Sandinist 
control. The Frente comprises parties loyal to the regime which are supposed 
to represent pluralist tendencies alongside the FSLN : the independent Liberal 
party (PLI), the Socialist Party of Nicaragua (PSN), the Social Christian 
People's Party (PP se>, the representatives of which are, however, given no 
room to manoeuvre by the Coordinadora. 
The construction of the powerful Sandinista Army, which even before the military 
! 
operations of opposition groups began on the borders was far larger than other 
Central American armies, attracted strong political opposition from outside, 
above all from Honduras, Costa Rica and finally from the USA. The regime of 
the Comandantes used this situation as a pretext for delivering body-blows to 
democracy and pluralism. 
1The non-violent opposition in exile is gathered together in the Asamblea 
Nicaraguense de Unidad Democratica <ANUDE). The armed opposition includes 
the democratic Alianza Revoluci6naria Democratica (ARDE) of Robelos and Pastora, 
some 3,000 Misquitos of the MISURASATA headed by Steadman Fagoth Muller and 
Fernando Chamorros democratic UDM-FARN as well as the FDN referred to above. 
2Members include : The partido Social Dem6crata (PSD), the Partido Social 
Cristiano <PSC), the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista <PLC), the Social 
Democratic Union <CUS) and the Christian-Socialist Union <CTN). 
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The press, radio and television were gradually brought in line. All radio 
programmes and newspapers are censored every day. The effectiveness of the 
daily 'La Presna• which alone has remained independent is substantially limited, 
as in Somoza•s day, by censorship and other repressive measures such as arbit-
rary restrictions on the allocation of paper or on sales. For example on 
Friday, 27 January 1984, 'La Prensa• failed to appear following the censor-
ship of 70% of its contents, including a statement of the conference of 
bishops. Violeta Chamorro, the widow of the editor of 'La Prensa• murdered 
under Somoza who left the first junta is nevertheless trying to keep the news-
paper in operation. 
Since 1982 the Sandinistas have found an effective instrument for the arbitrary 
arrest of and imposition of sentences on opposition forces without any legal 
procedure in the form of the emergency laws <Leyes de emergencia) and the 
blanket charge of •counter-revolution• ('actividades contrarevoluci6narias'). 
Christian-Socialist and Social Democratic trade unionists and left and right-
wing politicians and conservatives are particularly at risk from the Sandinist 
legal system. (The independent Commission on Human Rights, CPDH, gives the 
following figures from January to August 1983 there were some 802 political 
prisoners and 128 missing persons and 95 cases of torture were recorded.) 
Many of these political prisoners had already been persecuted under the Somoza 
dictatorship. In November 1983 alone 30 non-Sandinist trade unionists were 
arrested. Opposition politicians, trade unionists and their families, but 
also Christians and priests are terrorized and intimidated by •turbas•, organ-
ized shock troops. In view of this variety of repressive measures it is almost 
impossible to build up political and trade union organizations outside Sandinista 
control. 
Another group persecuted with increasing ruthlessness by the Sandinistas since 
1980 are the approximately 180,000 Misquito Indians who, together with the 
Sumos and Ramas, are the original inhabitants of Nicaragua in settlements pre-
dominantly on the border with Honduras and on the Atlantic coast. The 
Misquitos have traditionally been allowed Linguistic, cultural, administrative 
and religious autonomy- the overwhelming majority belong to the Protestant 
Iglesia Moravia (brotherhood) - but the Sandinistas have tried to integrate 
them forcibly on the pretext that this would benefit the economic exploitation 
of the region inhabited for centuries by these tribes. When the three population 
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groups resisted forcible integration, the Sandinista People's Army destroyed 
some of their villages, churches and hospitals and deported some 30,000 natives 
into four concentration camps in the interior of the country. According to 
conservative estimates approximately 1,000 Indians were killed during this 
forcible re-settlement and in the course of their resistance. Approximately 
18,500 or more than 10% fled to Honduras and some 3,000 joined the MISURASATA 
Leader Fagoth Muller in armed opposition to the Sandinistas. 
(f) The church 
----------
The Sandinistas have also entered into a conflict with the Catholic church which 
is now forced to campaign against violations of human rights and anti-democratic 
developments as in Somoza's day under the slogan 'peace, justice and freedom'. 
In addition, it attacks the Marxist/Leninist indoctrination in state schools 
and the militarization of the country. The Archbishop of Managua, Monsignor 
Miguel Obando y Bravo, has become a symbol for the self-assertion of the church 
against attempts to divide it and against the totalitarian state. 
The Pope's visit to Nicaragua j·n l983 turned into a demonstration of the people's 
Loyalty to the church and of the regime's desire to manipulate the masses by 
stirring up trouble. 
The Catholic church sharply opposed the introduction of conscription in the summer 
of 1983. Nicaragua now has approximately 100,000 Sandinista soldiers and 
militia men (out of 2.7 million inhabitants) -more men under arms than all other 
Central American states together. In August 1983 the Conference of Bishops 
spoke out clearly in favour of national defence but stated that no-one should be 
forced to do military service, in order to defend a particular ideology or to 
benefit one sole political party. 
On 30 September 1983 'turbas divinas' (divine legions) attacked six churches 
and assaulted the suffrage bishop of Managua, Monsignor Bosco Vivas. 
The regime aims, by means of basis communities, to build up a 'people's church' -
as opposed to the 'official church' - as an opposition within a church. Prom-
inent representatives of the government : Father Miguel D'Escoto (Foreign 
Minister), Ernesto Cardenal (Minister of Culture, who was awarded the peace 
prize of the German book trade) and Fernando Cardenal <Leader of Sandinist 
youth) support these attempts to undermine the unity of the church, which how-
ever meet with little sympathy among the population owing to the deep-rooted 
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Catholicism of the people of Nicaragua. Radio Cat6Lica is only allowed to 
broadcast religious programmes; the Latter are censored as are the pastoral 
Letters of the bishops. Nevertheless, contacts between church and state con-
tinue. 
The tensions between the Sandinistas and the Catholic church were revealed 
once again when in December 1983 it was officially announced - and then denied -
that the American bishop Schlaefer who had Lived in the country for 20 years 
had been murdered by counter-revolutionaries, whereas in fact he was accompanying 
Misquito refugees to Honduras. The Catholic church in Germany referred in 
this connection to a 'deliberate Lie'. 
After years of contradictory statements the coordinator of the junta, Daniel 
Ortega, announced at the beginning of December 1983 to the Council of State 
that elections would be held in 1985. In February 1984 it was then announced 
-after a temporary denial in response to an air raid by counter-revolutionaries -
that the President of State and a constituent assembly would be elected with a 
six-year mandate. The draft electoral Law has now been drawn up and the debate 
in the Council of State is due to take place in March 1984. On 20 February 
1984 Daniel Ortega scheduled the elections for 4 November 1984, two days before 
the American presidential elections, on a 'pluralist basis', and fixed the 
minimum age for voting at 16 years. 
The democratic opposition to the Coordinadora Democratica is sceptical whether 
in view of the conditions and these contradictory statements free democratic 
and pluralist elections will be possible. They call for a full restoration of 
democratic pluralism and consider that only then will the demands of the 
CONTADORA initiative be met. 
The have reservations with regard to the emergency laws, the restrictions on the 
press, on freedom of opinion and assembly, the Lack of access to the state-
controlled media, the pressure exerted by the government and the Sandinista 
grass-roots organizations on the democratic parties and non-Sandinist unions 
and Article 2 of the preamble and other provisions of the Party Law of 1983 
which state that all political Parties must be based on the principles of the 
Sandinist revolution. Furthermore, the Sandinistas either make no attempt to 
conceal that they are unwilling under any circumstances to hand over power, as 
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Minister of the Interior Borge stated in a television interview on ARD 
(Production No. 247071) in the summer of 1983, or they deny that elections 
are an essential part of modern democracy (this is what Daniel Ortega said in 
announcing the elections). It remains to be seen to what extent the selection 
of the Sandinista Presidential candidate leads to splits within the FSLN. 
The Government's offer of an amnesty in December 1983, and the announcement of 
elections are clearly intended to reassure an increasingly critical public 
opinion abroad. One hundred and thirty detained Misquitos and some Christian 
Socialist politicians have in fact been released in Managua. At the same time 
however there have been new arrests and there is no question of a restoration 
of the traditional rights of the Misquitos. The wording of the amnesty allows 
the regime to exclude individual politicians to which it takes exception. 
The agricultural reform which, following the expropriation of the Somoza family 
from its 1 million ha. estate is in its second phase, provide~ ~ove all fpr 
the distribution of the fallow land in estates over 370 hectares (law of 1982). 
According to the Government the aim of this measure is with reference to the 
standard of Living and the structure of agriculture, to allow people to exploit 
agricultural land, rather than to create property. Membership of cooperatives 
opens the way to social and educational benefits. The sale of land is organized 
centrally for the whole country and applies to all forms of production, both 
the private sector and cooperatives. The object is thus to achieve a planned 
economy rather than pluralism. At the same time the social and economic situ-
ation of the country is catastrophic, like in Cuba basic foodstuffs are 
rationed. The reasons for this state of affairs -which are not just confined 
to Nicaragua - are the collapse of the world market prices for the main export 
products <sugar, coffee, cotton) and the increase in the prices of imports such 
as oil and raw materials; this Leads to annual foreign debts of 850 million US$ 
for Nicaragua, which like El Salvador, is considered a serious creditor. In 
addition, there are domestic reasons such as the excessive militarization of 
the country and finally the consequences of armed opposition which is beginning 
to have a permanent impact on the infrastructure and economy of Nicaragua, as 
in El Salvador. 
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Two thousand Cuban military advisers (Havana acknowledges 200) are influencing 
Sandinist policy. Internationalists of all brands are present in the country 
and arms shipments from Libya disguised as medical products were recently 
detected in Brazil. It is generally accepted that the Sandinistas have polit-
ical and military Links with the FMLN guerrilla Leadership in Managua <EL 
Salvador) and have made incursions into Honduran territory. The Minister of 
the Interior, Tomas Borge, admitted in September 1983 quite openly that he was 
an exponent of the 'domino theory' in Central America and was thus pursuing 
the destabilization of the region 1• 
The conflicts in which Nicaragua has become involved with Costa Rica and 
Honduras are the product of the aggressive and expansionist military creed of 
'proletarian internationalism' of the Sandinistas. Both countries, but 
especially Costa Rica which has no army, feel threatened by the extremely 
powerful Sandinista armed forces which support subversive movements in their 
countries. Costa Rica has, as a preventive measure, called for an OAS peace 
force in the border region with Nicaragua and Honduras has, after six months' 
joint sea manoeuvres in 1983, further consolidated its close military cooper-
ation with the United States by granting the Latter a base on its territory. 
The revival of the CONDECA defence pact between EL Salvador, Honduras and 
Guatemala2 is also directed against the destabilization instigated by Cuba 
through the intermediary of Nicaragua. 
It is questionable, especially in view of the present forced militarization of 
the country, whether the Sandinista Government will depart from this course. 
Admittedly, Nicaragua very rapidly agreed to the CONTADORA peace initiative and 
submitted its own proposals, for instance, offers of a non-aggression pact 
with the USA, Costa Rica and Honduras. However, the next months will reveal to 
what extent this was a tactic to reassure world public opinion, the result of 
temporary concern at a possible counter-attack by the United States on the 
Grenada model or was based on a deeper insight into the need for peaceful devel-
opments for the benefit of all peoples in the region. In the medium-term the 
political and economic credibility of the regime will depend on the democratic 
development of the country and the restraint shown in foreign policy. If all 
democrats in free countries remain watchful then perhaps the final conversion of 
Nicaragua into a people's democracy on the Cuban model may be prevented. 
1
rnterview in 'Playboy' (American Edition), September 1983, p. 192 
2
officially Nicaragua is also a member. 
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Situated between Panama to the south and Nicaragua to the north-west, Costa 
Rica is regarded as a haven of democracy in Central America. Since 1948 when 
the founder of the Social Democratic Partido de Liberaci6n Nacional (PLN> and 
first democratic president, Jose Figueres, successfully overcame Communist 
opposition and established the presidential constitution which is still in 
force, Costa Rica has been a model of democratic stability in Latin America. 
Changes of power between the Government and opposition operate smoothly. The 
present Government of the Social Democrat Luis Alberta Mange (since 1982) 
which is based on a majority of 33 out of 57 Congress delegates (the apposit-
ional UNIDAD - the Christian Democrats and Liberals -have 18 seats while the 
Communist Party has four seats) has set about implementing its programme of 
economic revival of the country. 
Costa Rica is clearly pro-West in outlook. In the conflict between North and 
South Costa Rica is on the side of the developing countries but clearly favours 
pragmatic development solutions. As a result of this position Costa Rica 
enjoys a high degree of credibility and moral authority in all its foreign and 
security policy action. This is generally recognized. In 1949 Costa Rica 
adopted a new constitution and disbanded its armed forces and now only has a 
police force. The Social Democratic President of Costa Rica, Luis Alberta 
Monge, and his party take a highly discriminating view of the guerrilla move-
ment in EL Salvador and developments in Nicaragua which differ sharply from 
that of the Socialist International. Costa Rica is concerned that its 
'democratic achievements won by defeating the Communists in 1948' (to quote the 
Social Democrat founding President Figueres) could be threatend by Nicaragua 
and a left-wing EL Salvador. EL Salvador is seen as part of a 'regional 
problem' (ex-President Carazo). The frame of reference here is Central America 
and the aim is a democratic solution for the entire region, and at all events 
no Sandinist solution. Costa Rica is determined to resist a Communist-inspired 
revolution and in this it has the support of a Large majority of those in 
Government and opposition. It supports the CONTADORA initiative together with 
EL Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. It maintains a reserved - and occasionally 
even negative - attitude to the operations of Nicaraguan rebels from its 
territory (the ARDE of Pastora and Robelo in particular). Costa Rica has no 
desire to be forced into a military commitment. 
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Honduras borders on Nicaragua to the south, Guatemala to the north and EL 
Salvador to the north-west along the Pacific coastline. The borders between 
the countries have always been a source of controversy in Central American 
history. Honduras is the poorest country in Central America. In 1981 the 
first parliamentary democracy was established there by a parliamentary and 
presidential election supported by the armed forces. Its precarious economic 
situation has been made worse by the fall in the world coffee price. Some 
53% of the population is illiterate. As a result the recently established 
democratic government is faced with almost insuperable obstacles. 
After the elections in November 1981 Honduras acquired a civil <constitutional) 
government for the first time after decades of more or Less open military rule. 
President Suazo enjoys the support of an absolute majority of the Partido 
Liberal (PL; 44 out of 82 seats). The traditional majority Party, the Partido 
Nacional (PN) has 34 seats, the <new) centre-left Partido de Innovaci6n y 
Unidad (PINU) has three seats and the left-wing Partido Democratica Cristiano 
(PDC) has one seat. 
Honduras now finds it is between two areas of conflict. On the one side there 
is Nicaragua <with whom it previously enjoyed good relations) with its expan-
sionist revolutionary ideas and dominant military power. The refugees consist 
not only of Somoza supporters organized in the FDN guerrilla force fleeing from 
the Sandinist revolution, but also former Sandinist supporters who feel the 
revolution has been betrayed and are fleeing across the border to operate from 
Honduras as guerrillas against Nicaragua. The Sandinists fighting Somoza came 
across the same border. The refugee problem has been made even worse by some 
18,000 members of the Misquito, Sumo and Rama Indian tribes who fled across 
the border to Honduras because of the brutal Nicaraguan resettlement programme. 
So far the majority- i.e. those who do not join the MISURASATA in the struggle 
against the Government in Managua - have been absorbed by the Misquito tribes 
already in the country, with whom they are related. The escalating conflict 
has meant that Honduras has had to evacuate its own population from the border 
area. 
On the other side, there is a Long border with El Salvador, with which Honduras 
is constantly being involved in hostilities. The 'football war' in July 1969 
was brought to an end only with great difficulty by the OAS. 
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Many refugees from El Salvador (approximately 35,000) who found themselves 
between the guerrillas and the armed forces are adding to the refugee problem 
which the country is quite unable to deal with. These camps were frequently 
used by FMLN guerrillas as supply bases and thus became an additional military 
and political risk. Some of them were therefore moved to the centre of the 
country. The refugee problem would be impossible to solve without international 
aid, especially from the UN to which the EEC also contributes. Relations with 
EL Salvador have now returned to normal. Joint military operations on both 
sides of the borders against the supply routes of the FMLN guerrillas from 
Nicaragua to Honduran territory have proved successful. The military cooper-
ation of both countries with Guatemala in the framework of the CONDECA Agreement 
has been resumed. Honduras enjoys closer political and military relations with 
the United States than any other country in the region; this is evidenced by 
the fact that it took part in joint sea manoeuvres for 6 months in 1983 and 
has granted the United States a military base on its territory. The aim of 
these measures is to deter military attacks from Nicaragua. 
The international controversy surrounding Central America, and El Salvador in 
particular which reached a height in 1981 and the first half of 1982 has now 
turned in part to Guatemala. In March 1982, General Rios Montt, supported by 
young officers favouring reform, came to power in a coup and brought an end to 
the military dictatorship which had reigned for 20 years. The Rios Montt 
Government's main aim was to suppress the ever-stronger guerrillas and restore 
order. It undertook to improve the human rights situation and carry out a 
constitutional reform by 1985. After a one-month amnesty, however, the govern-
ment resorted to harsh repressive measures to control the guerrillas. Captured 
guerrillas were sentenced to deat by special tribunals. A particularly provoc-
ative gesture occurred shortly before Pope John Paul II visited the country 
when executions were carried out despite an appeal for clemency from the Pope. 
In August 1983 the Rios Montt regime was overthrown in a coup by the armed 
forces after the President, who belongs to a Protestant sect, had begun to pers-
ecute the Catholic Church, to pursue different policy objectives and to suppress 
free pluralistic elections. 
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Following pressure from the OAS Human Rights Commission and the US Government, 
a national human rights commission was set up consisting of representatives of 
the government, university, employers, trade unions, press and Indian tribes 
but was unable to have a decisive effect on the situation. 
The new President, General Oscar Mejia Victores, undertook to Lead the country 
towards democracy and respect for human rights. However, so far there is no 
sign of any far-reaching improvement in the situation or indeed of any clear 
government policy. Oppression continues and the democratic opposition such as 
the Christian Democrats who initially had some faith in Rios Montt are increas-
ingly persecuted and victims among the civil population are steadily increasing. 
Much will depend on whether the elections announced for July 1984 can really be 
held- and democracy established- despite the struggle against the guerrillas. 
Freedom of the press and freedom of speech are non-existent. Despite some 
efforts to achieve a pluralist party system the armed forces dominate the 
scene. Guatemala has joined the CONTADORA initiative together with other states 
in the region, but at the same time has begun to play an active role in CONDECA, 
the Central American defence alliance, with Honduras and EL Salvador which was 
revived in 1983. Social tensions persist. It seems as if the reforms intro-
duced by Rios Montt, above all the agricultural reforms, are being dismantled. 
VI. The role of the United States 
The US is inevitably involved in any developments in this region. This applies 
not only to security, but also economic developments. The emergence of Marxist/ 
Leninist revolutionary movements, such as those in Nicaragua, Grenada and the 
'national liberation movements' in El Salvador and Guatemala since the Cuban 
revolution, has alarmed the United States. 
Perhaps American governments in the past were not sufficiently concerned about 
the removal of the colonial regimes and the oligarchies and dictatorships which 
succeeded them, and which were supported by the Untied States for many years 
because of trade interests, and their replacement by democratic systems. This 
explains the traditionally strained relations between the USA and numerous 
Latin American countries although the extreme (official) anti-Americanism of 
Cuba and Nicaragua are exceptions. 
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.. 
But since the Carter Administration and even under President Reagan, the stabi-
lization of democracy and a lasting improvement of human rights have played an. 
increasingly important role. No political stabilization can come about without 
economic stabilization of the region. American support for the armed forces 
and thus support for a political power which is scarcely comprehensible for 
Europeans today creates pifficulties for all Central American states although 
in some cases they see this as necessary. Within the whole of Latin America, 
apart from a few exceptions (Costa Rica and Mexico), the armed forces are 
almost a constituent part of every regime. It would be impossible anywhere to 
implement a policy directed against the armed forces. This applies both to 
right-wing and to left-wing regimes. Clearly the United States is nowadays 
adopting a more sophisticated approach to its support for the various attempts 
to create democratic governments and constitutions than in the past. 
Any direct intervention by the United States - which seemed acceptable in the 
case of Grenada because Cuba had almost occupied the island - would have dis-
astrous consequences for the region, and anyway is rejected by the Americans as 
utterly unthinkable. US. policy is directed towards consolidating those govern-
ments willing to embark on reforms and democracy and against the revolutionary 
movements supported by Cuba. The United States has recognized that given the 
crass social distinctions which cannot be redressed by right-wing dictatorship, 
it is inevitable in the long term to support the more democratic forms of 
government if dictatorships of the right are not to be replaced in civil war, 
which bring unremitting misery for the population, by revolutionary dictator-
ships of the left. Those may rid the country of the extreme right-wing and 
rich oligarchies but cannot satisfy the needs of the people and promote their 
own initiatives and develop democratic forms of State and society. 
The cornerstones of the changing policy of the United States towards Central 
America and the Caribbean are the following inter-related issues : the USA's 
own security interests, support for democratic and pluralist solutions and 
the rapid defusing of the potential social conflict fuelled by poverty and 
under-development. 
American initiatives 
--------------------
- The Caribbean Plan 
This new US policy is reflected in the proposals made by President Reagan in 
February 1982 for a 'Caribbean Basin Plan'. This plan provides for customs 
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preferences for imports to the USA for 12 years,_apart from textiles (although 
87% of Caribbean imports to the USA are already exempt from customs duty), 
incentives for US companies investing in the Caribbean basin for 12 years and 
financial aid of $350,000 to alleviate economic difficulties. The plan, of 
which Congress finally only approved a small proportion, is however encounter-
ing growing scepticism from all states in the Caribbean, because of its 
relatively low financial volume and the excessive delay in implementation. 
- The Kissinger Plan 
Repeated visits by President Reagan's special envoy to Central America, Richard 
Stone, who has now resigned, to all countries of the region and the CONTADORA 
states - Columbia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela - visits by Congress delega-
tions and the setting-up of a national two-party commission headed by former 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, <the Kissinger Mission) have helped to 
improve the stock of information about the region and to establish the pre-
viously uncoordinated initiatives on a firmer and more dependable conceptual 
and financial basis. 
The Kissinger Plan submitted in 19841 makes a decisive contribution to this 
objective. Using traditional forms of approach to Central America he estab-
Lishes three main objectives : 
(1) Democratic self-determination 
<2> Support for economic and social development to the benefit of all 
(3) Cooperation with the aim of averting the security threat to the region. 
On this basis, to which is added a comprehensive analysis of the crisis in 
Central America from the point of view of poverty and social injustice, economic 
instability and the destabilization attempts instigated by Cuba and the Soviet 
Union in the region, the Commission proposes a package of specific mutually 
inter-related mensures : 
o on a stage-by-stage basis from 1984 to 1990 Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Panama would receive a total of US $20.6 billion 2 
and Nicaragua, which at present is excluded from the US aid programme, 
US $3.4 billion in the form of economic aid. 
1Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, Washington, 
11 January 1984. 
2c . 5 1 L l osta R1 ea : • ; E Sa vador 
Panama : 3.2 billion US$. 
5.5; Guatemala 4.5; Honduras : 2.3; 
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o Under the heading 'Human Development' increased aid would be made avail-
able for culture, education, health and housing programmes. 
o The creation of a stable peace in the region based on the principles of 
non-intervention and the sovereignty, independence and integrity of all 
Central American countries, the specific commitment to pluralist democracy 
and respect for human rights and a defusing of tension in the region by 
arms reductions; permanent crisis management is to be carried out by a 
council of the five Foreign Ministers, with the USA, Mexico, Panama, 
Columbia and Venezuela sending observers. 
The report also recommends supporting the CONTADORA peace initiative and 
regular consultations with the European allies. 
It is not yet clear whether the ambitious objectives of the Kissinger Plan, 
particularly as regards the financial part, can be fully implemented and now 
that the President has agreed to it in principle whether Congress will also 
approve the Plan. Theoretically, however, the Kissinger Plan is an essential 
contribution to a new American policy in Central America. 
Generally speaking, the United States is now beginning to react in a more 
flexible and convincing manner to existing conflicts. The new turn taken by US 
policy in Central America is shown by the high priority given to respect for 
human rights, support for democratic and pluralist developments and reforms to 
create sounder economic and social structures and to defuse potentially revol-
utionary conflicts in the area. US policy could serve to disarm the threat of 
(military) force- whether left or right- and to prevent, in the medium term, 
Communist destabilization attempts. 
VII. The CONTADORA peace initiative 
In view of the explosive situation in Central America where at any time individ-
ual conflicts could spread throughout the whole region with incalculable inter-
national consequences for East-West relations, there have been repeated attempt> 
since 1979 - the date of the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua 
and the escalation of the guerrilla war in El Salvador- to find peaceful 
political solutions. Al~ states, parties and groups involved in the conflicts 
have taken part in these attempts but no concrete results have been achieved. 
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The most important peace moves have been Launched by Mexico and Venezuela which, 
despite their different forms of state and society, have a vital interest in a 
reduction of tension in the region and have always acted as intermediaries in 
conflicts among their Central American neighbours. As a result of these efforts 
at the beginning of October 1982 the Foreign Ministers of eight Caribbean states, 
together with the USA, issued a statement in which they undertook to support the 
principles of peaceful democratic change and economic and social progress. These 
good declarations of intent have, however, not been followed up by concrete 
action and tensions have increased dramatically 
In this explosive situation, the peace initiative put forward by the CONTADORA 
states of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela seems to offer the only gleam 
of hope. Early in September 1983, the principles of the 10-point statement of 
Cancun <17.7.1983) were consolidated in a draft 21-point non-aggression treaty1 
which has meanwhile been formally approved by all the states involved in the 
conflict -Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, EL Salvador and Guatemala- as a 
declaration of intent. The European Community supports this initiative, and 
the Sixth EC-Latin America Interparliamentary Conference <13-16.6.1983 in 
Brussels) also approved it unanimously. From all sides there have been only 
positive reactions. 
If the prevailing attitude is still one of scepticism as to the chances of 
success, this is certainly not the fault of the - in every resepct - Logical 
and convincing text of the treaty which covers : 
- halting the arms race in Central America; 
-controlled reduction of the existing military resources; 
a ban on installing foreign bases and on outside military interference in 
domestic affairs; 
-reduction in the number of foreign military advisors; 
the creation of democracy and pluralism and confidence-building measures; 
-a halt to the destabilization of governments from the territory of any of 
the partners to the treaty. 
In order to create a climate of confidence, the members of the CONTADORA group 
ought to ensure that the text of the treaty will be interpreted in a uniform 
way and introduce realistic and feasible sanctions for the event of any infringe-
ments of the treaty. The CONTADORA state of Mexico, for instance, allows, does 
1
see Doe. PE 87.451 of 3.11.1983 (The Latin-American Delegation). 
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not prevent or cannot prevent the Guatemalan guerrillas from obtaining most cif 
their recruits from its territory - for the danger point in the whole region is 
that Liberation movements alternately operate directly or indirectly from 
foreign territories in order to destabilize their own or other countries. 
The interests of the various parties are too disparate, the ideologically-ba~ed 
definitions of interference and non-interference, of justified or unjustified 
guerrilla action, are too different, and it remains quite unclear which instru-
ments of control, supervision and sanction are to be introduced. 
In addition, there are the following obvious problems 
-Since the conflict in Central America and the Caribbean is partly determined 
by the East-West opposition, any peaceful solution must also involve the USA 
and Cuba. Both approve the CONTADORA-group initiative in principle, but are 
delaying their decision on the nature of their cooperation, regardless of 
the fact that they are already closely involved in the treaty negotiations, 
pending the submission of an agreement on which a cons~nsas can be reached. 
-While Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador insist on the need for 
progress towards democracy as a precondition for peaceful solutions, Sandinistan 
Nicaragua will not commit itself to any specific form of state or society. 
- Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador want a purely Central American 
solution, although if need be they will accept the mediation of the CONTADO~A 
group, while Nicaragua, in order to escape from its political isolation, is, 
seeking the backing of the United Nations, among others, for its position •. 
Nevertheless, the European Community must continue to support the CONTADORA 
group's attempt to make the peace, and it must do so more emphatically than 
before. There appears to be no alternative, for if the existing conflicts con-
tinue this will futher destroy the basis of survival of the various peoples, . 
and any escalation into war could end in a catastrophe that could scarcely be. 
kept confined to the region. It is in the European Community's own vital 
interests to ensure that the tensions are reduced and not exacerbated. 
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VII. The European Community and Central America 
Relations between the Community and Central America are part of the complex 
pattern of relations between the European Community and Latin America. 
In his statement on the German Presidency of the Council of 11 January 1983, 
the German President of the Council, the Federal Foreign Minister Mr Genscher 
said : 'The Ten view developments in Central America with concern. The polit-
ical tensions in this region carry with them the risk of grave escalation 
with unforeseeable consequences. The countries of the European Community 
accordingly welcome initiatives from states of the region, which may lead to a 
reduction of tension.' There is cause for deep scepticism over developments 
in Nicaragua, which is moving further and further away from its original goals 
of pluralism, a mixed economy and non-alignment to become the focal point of 
crisis in Central America. 
On 11 March 1982 the Commission forwarded to the European Parliament Document 
PE 77.723/Annex which reviewed Community aid to El Salvador. Aid had been 
restricted solely to emergency aid and food aid to a value of 6.875 m ECU. The 
aid for needy schoolchildren which the Commission stopped in 1980 has not been 
resumed. Up to and including 1980 the balance of trade between the Community 
and El Salvador fell by 137 points (imports 60, exports 233, source : Eurostat 
quoted in Doe. PE 78.590/Annex/fin.). 
In the special progamme for Central America adopted by the Council, El Salvador 
has been excluded for the time being because of the instability of its demo-
cratic institutions. Nicaragua was also excluded but received funds under aid 
for non-associated countries in 1982 though the Commission has stated that this 
aid is also subject to the vicissitudes in that country's democratic development •. 
In its resolution on relations between the EEC and Central America of 
14 October 1982, the European Parliament observed : 'The European Parliament 
feels that the European Community should formulate a global policy towards 
Central America which incorporates the various f~~tors and instruments at present 
operating individually .•• ' 
In its resolution on aid to non-associated countries (Michel report) Doe. 
1-784/82 of 19 November 1982 the European Parliament stressed 'thepositive role 
which the Community can play in this region, a role which reflects the wishes of 
the countries concerned I . . . . 'Approves the regional character of the initiative· 
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which means that all the non-associated countries in the area, i.e. the countries 
of the Central American Common Market <El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama) and those on Hispaniola (Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic) will be eligible ••• •. 
In both reports the European Parliament agrees on 
-the development of a comprehensive Community policy towards Central America, 
- the integration and further development of the existing criteria for this 
policy, 
- concrete objectives which above all have as their aim the improvement of 
living conditions in one of the poorest and most severely disadvantaged 
regions of the world 
o further development of agricultural reforms, 
o development of cooperatives, 
o development of the in~ernal market, 
o development of indigenous alternative sources of energy, 
o development of transport infrastructure, 
o reduction of balance of payments deficit!. 
The conditions set by the Commission and the Council of Ministers in the special 
programme establish priorities for all areas in the region. 
We can only agree with the Commission when, in its special action programme 
<COM<82> 257 final>, it cites the following as the aims of greater Community 
involvement under paragraph I 
'- the Community should make a greater effort to help solve the problems in 
the socio-economic structures of these countries, which are the cause of 
the current instability ••• (and) ••• ensure that the impact is quick and 
substantial enough to produce tangible results not only from the political 
point of view but also in terms of economic efficiency.' 
It is also to be welcomed that Costa Rica, Honduras and the Dominican Republic 
have been included in the programme from the outset. If account is to be taken 
of the overall development in the region, however, the current conflicts must 
not be exacerbated by uneven implementation of Community aid, which should in-
stead be extended to all countries in the region. In particular, support should 
also be given to those countries which in addition to introducing pluralist 
democratic constitutions have also begun reforms to implement the abovementioned 
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programme. This includes EL Salvador. In its development aid programmes the 
European Community should adopt a consistent and united approach, as do the 
neighbouring states in Central America, in order to avoid increasing tension 
and becoming involved in confrontation. 
Although there is therefore unanimity about the principles of Community aid to 
Central America and the Caribbean, crucial questions of detail have not yet 
been settled or have been answered in an unsatisfactory way. They relate not 
only to the special programme for Central America, but also to the overall 
package of Community cooperation with the region, including humanitarian aid. 
- The first problem is the criteria for selecting partner countries. Owing to 
the Lack of agreement in the Council of the EEC about EL Salvador, Guatemala 
and Nicaragua, the special programme is confined to Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic and Honduras. The current programmes include Nicaragua, but not 
EL Salvador. If, as much evidence suggests, the selection criteria include 
the political situation, human rights and the degree of democracy, it is 
impossible to understand why EL Salvador, which is involved in a difficult 
but constantly advancing democratic process, is excluded while Nicaragua is 
still included. 
- The choice of projects should be determined not only by whether they satisfy 
the formal requirements set out in the List of criteria but also by whether 
they are of direct and practical help to the people. When we see, as in 
Nicaragua, that the Kolkhoz type of cooperative receives special state sup-
port in the framework of agricultural reform we must examine to what extent 
old forms of dependence on Large Landowners are merely replaced by new forms 
of dependence on state bureaucracy, instead of giving as many farmers as 
possible their own Land. 
The Community aid programmes should in principle be carried out via non-state 
bodies and organizations, such as churches and ecclesiastical relief agencies, 
the Red Cross and, where appropriate, UN bodies (e.g. the High Commission 
for Refugees). This applies equally to countrie~ .ith an unstable political~ 
situation and where democracy is either not adva.~c.ng or is regressing, 
It is also urgently necessary to review the Commission's procedure for grantinn 
humanitarian aid. In individual cases, for instance the appropriation of 1 m ECJ 
allocated by an urgent resolution of the European Parliament in January 1983 
for Misquito refugees, it is not clear whether and how this aid really reached 
them. 
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The Commission must, as a matter of urgency, review in depth the effectiveness 
of aid programmes - both planned and already implemented - so as to detect 
sources of error at an early stage. 
The Community will have to check whether it wants to take part in the United 
States' proposed 'mini-Marshall Plan' in the region as set out in the 
Kissinger report. The objective should be to implement and coordinate the 
aid as compactly and efficiently as possible by cooperation between the main 
industrialized countries, including Japan and Canada. The USA seems to take 
a favourable view of such plans, and our Latin American partners are very 
much in favour of triangular cooperation between the USA and Canada, the 
Community and Japan. 
Conclusions 
Great and possibly exaggerated hopes are placed in the European Community as a 
possible intermediary between the region of Central America and the USA, as an 
economic partner and as a source of support in the peaceful struggle for democ-
racy and human rights. Despite all trade difficulties Latin Americans feel 
closely attached to Europeans and hope for a policy that will lead to better 
cooperation. 
The EEC must therefore take all measures, while strictly adhering to the principle 
of non-intervention, to support and stabilize peaceful pluralist developments in 
the region by special aid programmes aimed at reducing social tensions. 
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ANNEX I 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1981- 1982 
25 September 1981 DOCUMENT 1-543/81 
I· ngJi,h Edition 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr GLINNE, Mrs I. van den HEUVEL and 
Mrs H. WIECZORE>K--ZEUL 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on El Salvador 
(PE74.928) 
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The European Parliament, 
J whereas since the beginning of 1981 7,000 lives have been lost in El 
Salvador and in 1980 almost 0. 3% of the pol?ul<'ltion in Et SalvC\dlH' was 
exterminated, 
- whereas without political intercession between the Junta and the 
government on the one hand and the FDR/FLMN opposition on the other 
and in the absence of a political settlement this decimation of the 
people will continue, 
- seeking to put an end to the war in El Salvador as swiftly as possible, 
to prevent further suffering among its people, to end violations of 
human'rights and restore democracy in El Salvador, 
- whereas the people of El Salvador must be guaranteed, as must all 
peoples, the right of self-determination which includes thP right to 
determine its own course and future, 
- whereas the causes of the war and social conflicts in El Salvador are to 
be found in that country's colonial past, glaring social injustice and 
inequalities and the years of opposition to the necessary social reforms, 
1. Calls for the immediate opening of talks between the Junta and the FDR/ 
FLMN and uqes the USA to cease its opposition to a negotiated political 
settlement and to recognize the FDR/FLMN as a negotiating partner~ 
2. Condemns military intervention in El Salvador in the form of military 
advisers, arms supplies and support matcri«l. This vinlatt•s lhe right 
of the people of El Salvador to self-determination. Such intervention 
represents an obstacle to a political settlement by encouraging the 
military leaders seeking a military •solution' - at the expense of the 
civilian elements in the Junta and the government - and prolongs the 
suffering of the people. An end to military aid is therefore a pre-
requisite for a political settlement~ 
3. Condemns the systematic violation of human rights which is also practised 
by official state institutions and wishes every effort to be made without 
delay to end torture, deportations and murder and to restore a democratic 
system in El Salvador with freedom of activity for all political parties 
and trade unions, freedom of speech, etc. 
4. Calls on the Commission and the governments of the Member states of the 
Community, as part of European Political Cooperation, to organize an 
international conference on El Salvador, analogous to that proposed by 
-so·-
~E 8~.121/fin./Ann.I 
the Foreign MiniEtt~1rs on Afghanistan, to promote the ~yn:~l of " pol i.t i~·;-.1 
Sl"t t ll'lll\('lll i 
5. Wishes the Commhalion and tlw Coun<•i.l nf Mtnil'!tcra tn ~ludy propns.ll~; •'thl 
submit these to the I~uropean Par.li~~ment on how the Conuuunity ea~ <.'l"llJt.ribnh' 
to furthering self-determination in Central America through ~conomic, 
trade and development cooperation; 
6. Wishes th~ community to support through cooperation part~cularly those 
countries in central America which have abolished dictator~hips or 
restored democracy; 
7. Calls for swift, unbureaucratic humanitarian and food aid to be given 
to Salvadorian refugees in Central America and the displaced persons 
in El salvador, condemns any attempt to prevent the Community from 
giving such aid and wishes this aid to be supplied through non-
gcwcrnmental organizations such as tht1 Intt>rm•tional Re~oi C~os!', the or~'<"ll 
Cross or the Catholic Relief SC!rvicc and at illl events, on a la.J.·g<.'r scalt>; 
8. Calls on the Commission and the Council to seek assurance' from governments 
in Central America that their countries are adhering tQ the U~ Convention 
on the Status of Refugees and not allowing refugees from El Salvador to 
be forcibly repatriated: 
9. Instructs its President to follow this resolution to the Council and 
Commission and to the Foreign Ministers meeting in poliuieal cooperation. 
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ANNEX II 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1982-1983 
23 September 1982 DOCUMENT 1-635/82 
Engli~h Edition 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mrs DURY, Mr G.FUCHS, Mr VERNIMMEN, Mr LOMAS, 
Mr ROGERS, ~r GABERT, Mrs van den HEUVEL, Mrs WIECZOREK-
lWL, r-1r HANSCH, f.l.rs of.lACCWCCHI, Mr ~an 14l~N, ;f,1.rs FUILLEl, 
r 
Mr ALBERS, Mr PAPANTONIOU, Mrs VAYSSADE, Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK, 
Mr PELIKAN, Mr VGENOPOULOS, Mr GLINNE, Mrs PERY, Mr ARNDT, 
Mr RIEGER, Mr PONIRIDIS, Mr PERCHERON, Mr PLASKOVITIS, 
Mr BOYES, and Mr RADOUX. 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on Salvadorean refugees in Honduras 
( PE 80.546 ) 
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A- whereas the Honduran authorities have already deported, against their 
will, 10,000 Salvadorean refugees from La Virtud and La Guarita, both 
near the Salvadorean frontier, to Mesa Grande where living conditions 
are inhuman, 
B- whereas the Honduran authorities have also announced their intention 
to move the 6,000 Salvadorean refugees from the Colomancagua camp, 
C- whereas the deportation of the refugees Living initially at La Virtud 
and La Guarita, together with the departure of the representatives of 
international humanitarian organizations, was followed by the 
militarization of these regions, 
D- whereas the majority of those living in the Colomancagua camp have 
stated in writing that they do not wish to be deported to Mesa Grande, 
E- whereas the announcement of the deportation of people living at 
Colomancagua represents a strengthening of Honduras• policy of 
militarizing frontier regions, 
F- whereas the aim of this militarization policy was to prevent new would-
be refugees from El Salvador entering Honduras and to give free rein 
to the Salvadorean Guardia operating on Honduras territory, 
G- whereas the Honduran authorities have rejected the proposal from 
international humanitarian organizations that reception centres should 
be set up in the frontier areas for would-be Salvadorian political 
refugees, 
H- whereas the troops operating in the militarized zones systematically 
hunt Honduran peasants who have assisted Salvadorean refugees, 
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1. Calls on the President of the European Parliament and the President 
of the Council of Ministers to make immediate representations to 
the Honduran authorities to ensure that: 
- the inhabitants of the Mesa Grande camp are transferred to a 
location where there are better sanitary, climatic and security 
conditions, 
- the inhabitants of the Colomancagua camp are not deported to 
Mesa Grande, 
- the international humanitarian organizations are able to set 
up reception centres in the frontier regions, 
- the Honduran army no longer collaborates with the Salvadorean 
forces pursuing the refugees, 
- the Honduran authorities adopt a general and positive policy of 
respecting the rights of refugees and would-be refugees; 
2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, 
the Commission and the Governments of the Member States. 
PE 89.121/fin./Ann.II 
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15 March 1983 
English Edition 
ANNEX Ill 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1983-1984 
DOCUMENT 1-18/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr VANDEMEULEBROUCKE, Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK, 
Mrs PAUWELYN, Mrs DURY, Mr van MINNEN and Mr VAN MIERT 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the situation in Central America 
(PE 83. 734) 
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A. having regard to the persistent political violence in Central America, 
B. concerned at the danger which this situation constitutes for world peace, 
C. referring to the resolutions on various aspects of this situation and, 
more particularly, to : 
the resolution of 17.9.81 on the violation of human rights in Guatemala 
(Doe. 1-835/80), 
the resolution of 17.9.81 on the situation in El Salvador <Doe. 1-472/81 
and Doe. 1-486/81), 
the resolution of 17.6.82 on the situation in Nicaragua (Doe. 1-332/82) 
and 
the resolution of 11.3.82 on the situation in El Salvador, 
D. having regard to the reports by Amnesty International, 
1. Calls for the establishment of a dialogue leading to negotiations between 
the main parties involved in the conflict in El Salvador and for the said 
parties to relax their intransigent attitude which is standing in the way 
of a just peace; 
2. Requests the Commission of the European Communities and the Foreign Ministers 
meeting in political cooperation to take steps to facilitate a dialogue 
between the governments of Honduras and Nicaragua in order to prevent border 
disputes from escalating into a regional war which would cause great suffering 
to the entire population of Central America; 
3. Condemns the massacres of the civilian population involving the annihilation 
of whole families and villages, such as has occurred amongst the peasant and 
Indian populations in Guatemala; 
4. Condemns the policy of foreign military intervention and calls for arms 
deliveries and the sending of military advisers to Central America to be 
curtailed; 
5. Requests the parliamentary delegation to th~ European Community/Latin America 
Conference to place the situation in Centra~ America on the agenda of the 
sixth Interparliamentary Conference; 
6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and 
the Council of the European Communities and to the Governments of 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
PE 89.121/fin./Ann.III 
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ANNEX IV 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1983 1984 
DOCUMENT 1-237/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr BARB!, Mr VERGEER, Mr PEDINI, 
Mr LANGES, Mr PENDERS, Mr MARCK, MrS LENZ, Mrs WALZ, 
Mr ALBER and Mrs LENTZ-CORNETTE 
on behalf of the Group of the European People's 
Party <C·D Group> 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on Nicaragua 
(PE 84.504) 
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A. having regard to its resolutions Does. 1-222/82 and 1-332/82, 
e. concerned at the fact that the military regime in Nicaragua; 
- is increasingly distancing itself from a move towards democracy and 
pluralism, contrary to the announcements made by the junta on taking 
power in 1979, and is thereby abandoning the basis on which all 
democratic forces combined to overcome the dictatorship of Somoza; 
- is seeking, as all the evidence shows, to establish a monopoly role 
in state and society for the Sandinistas; 
- is repeatedly postponing the holding of free elections; 
- is drastically curtailing freedom of speech and freedom of the press; 
- is persecuting ethnic minorities such as the Misquitos, Sumos and Ramas, 
depriving them of their cultural, linguistic and religious identity and 
displacing them by force from their native regions to camps in the 
interior, or driving them into exile; 
- is involved,to a large extent,with Cuba in destabilizing the region 
by giving open military support to so-called liberation movements, 
thereby encouraging external interference in the domestic affairs 
of the countries of Central America, with the aim of replacing the 
previous United States hegemony with a Soviet/Cuba version, 
C. disturbed at the present hostilities in the border area between Honduras 
and Nicaragua,which constitute a serious threat to peace in the region, 
D. convinced that only a policy directed towards the creation of democratic, 
pluralist structures can satisfy the interests of the people of Nicaragua 
and that any return to the Somoza regime or similar dictatorial systems 
is in conflict with those interests, 
E. recognising the peace initiatives of Costa Rica, Colombia and Peru, 
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1. Calls on the Sandinista government of Nicaragua: 
- to return to pluralist, democratic structures and to allow all 
political groups the unrestricted right to participate in the 
democratic opinion-forming process; 
- to hold free elections as soon as possible under international 
supervision; 
- to restore freedom of speech and freedom of the press; 
-to cease persecuting and displacing ethnic and religious minorities 
and to restore to them their former right to independence and cultural 
and religious autonomy within the framework of the state; 
- to desist forthwith from all attempts to destabilize the region by 
lending military support to gu•rilta groups in neighbouring ceuntries, 
or to increase tensions and thus the danger of a regional conflict, 
since otherwise foreign powers might be induced to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the states of Central America; 
2. ~xpects other countries, for their part, to refrain from any form of 
direct or indirect interference in the domestic affairs of Nicaragua, 
and condemns any interference from outside; 
3. Supports all serious initiatives, including those of Costa Rica, 
Colombia and Peru, aimed at bringing about immediate negotiations on 
a peaceful solution to the explosive border conflict between 
Nicaragua and Honduras, but hopes that the overall situation in 
Central America will be the subject of a general peace conference 
as soon as possible; 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Presidents 
of the Council and the Commission, the governments of the countries 
concerned and the President of the Latin-American Parliament. 
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26 APRIL 1983 
English Edition 
ANNEX V 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
. 1983 - . 1984 
DOCUMENT 1-242/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr EPHREMIDIS, Mr ADAMOU, Mr ALAVANOS, 
Mrs BADUEL GLORIOSO, Mrs BARBARELLA, Mr BONACCINI, 
Mr CARDIA, M~s CERETTONI ROMAGNOLI, Mr CAROSSINO, 
Mr CERAVOLO, Mrs CINCIARI RODANO, Mr D'ANGELOSANTE, 
Mr DE PASQUALE, Mr FERRERO, Mr GALLUZZI, Mr GOUTHIER, 
Mr IPPOLITO, Mr LEONARDI, Mr PAPAPIETRO, Mr SEGRE, 
Mrs SQUARCIALUPI, Mr VERONESI, Mr VITALE, Mr GREMETZ, 
Mr DENIS, Mr WURTZ, Mrs POIRIER, Mrs DE MARCH, 
Mr FERNANDEZ, Mr VERGES, Mr MARTIN, Mr BAILLOT, 
Mr PIQUET and Mr CHAMBEIRON 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on hostile action towards Nicaragua 
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A. having regard to the efforts of the Nicaraguan Government to bring about 
a political settlement of the tense situation existing on its borders, 
B. having regard to the European Parliament's resolution on the European 
Community's economic relations with Central America <EEC 292/8/11/82>, 
C. having regard to the paragraph in the explanatory statement stressing 
the desire to sign a mutual agreement with Nicaragua, which overthrew 
the Somoza dictatorship but is threatened by lack of support from the 
USA and by the USA's openly hostile stance in view of its high military 
expenditure, 
1. Condemns the attacks against Nicaragua made by the supporters of 
Somoza based in Honduras and all foreign aid for Somoza's supporters 
regardeless ot where it comes from; 
2. Calls upon Honduras to cease all activities against Nicaragua; 
3. Believes that the activities of Honduras are inconsistent with the 
principle referred to in the resolution of 14 October 1982 COJ C 292,8/11/82) 
on the ~ndependent self-determined development and autonomy of the region'; 
4. Expresses its support for the people of Nicaragua subjected to these 
unjust attacks; 
5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of 
Ministers, the Governments of the Member States, Nicaragua, Honduras 
and the USA. 
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English Edition 
ANNEX VI 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
198 3-198 4 
DOCUMENT 1-249/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr BOYES, Mr LINKOHR, Mrs van den HEUVEL, Mr GLINN~, 
Mrs VIEHOFF, Mr PLASKOVITIS, Mrs NIKOLAOU, Mr G FUCHS 
and Mrs DURY, on behalf of the Socialist Group 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the situation in Nicaragua 
(PE 84.601) 
PE 89.121/fin./Ann.VI 
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A. conc•rned about the fighting in Nicaragua which is r•sulting in th• deaths 
of many innocent people, 
e. concerned that well-documented evidence indicates that there are 200 CIA 
agents operating in Central America, 
c. aware that the Republican leader in the Senate, Mr Howard BAKER has said 
that many of his colleagues are deeply worried about the situation in 
Nicaragua, 
D. aware that a secret document has been prepared by the National Security 
Planning Group in President REAGAN's administration and it states 
'in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas are under increased pressure as a result 
of our covert efforts', 
E. concerned that the activities on the Honduras/Nicaragua border are now • 
in danger of escalating into a full-scale war in the region, 
F. aware that aid to Honduras from the government of the USA has 
increased ten-fold from S3 million in 1980 to S30 million in 1982, 
1. Recognizes the self-determination of states and the principle of non-
intervention as agreed by both sides at the 5th meeting of the European 
Parliament and Latin-American Parliament in 1981 in Bogota, Columbia; 
2. CAlls on the Council of Ministers to ask the President of the United 
States of America to respect these principles; 
3. CAlls upon the Commission to increase economic aid to the government of 
Nicaragua, because destabililation of this country could lead to economic 
problems on a large scale in the region; 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Member States 
of the European Community, to the Commission, the Council of Ministers 
and the President of the United States of America.• 
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ANNEX VII 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1983 - 1984 
DOCUMENT 1-289/83 
I· 
I 
. 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
Tabled by Mrs VAN HEMELDONtK, Mr GLINNE and Mrs VAN DEN HEUVEL 
I 
I 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the arrest of ANA MARGARITA GASTEAZORO 
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( DE: RI.. 1.17) 
' 
The European Parliament, 
A. having regard to its resolution on El Salvador1, 
a. having regard to its resolution on the situation in El Salvador2, 
c. whereas on 12 May 1981 the Salvadorean authorities arrested 
ANA MARGARITA GASTEAZORO, a •eMber of the MOVIMIENTO NACIONAL 
REVOLUTIONARIO CMNR), on a charge of having attended the 
conferences of Socialist International Woaen in Vancouver (1978) 
and Madrid (1980), 
o. whereas ANA MARGARITA GASTEAZORO has not been brought before a court 
but is still in detention, 
1. Condemns the treatment of ANA MARGARITA GASTEAZORO by the 
Salvadorean authorities; 
2. Calls on the Salvadorean authorities to release her i .. ediately; 
3. Calls on the Foreign Ministers •eeting in political cooperation to 
take the necessary steps to ensure that El Salvador co•plies with 
this request; 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign 
Ministers meeting in political cooperation, the Council, the 
Commission, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. 
1 OJ No C 260, 12.10.81, p.89 
2 OJ No C 87, 5.4.82, p.79. 
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ANNEX VIII 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1983-1984 
DOCUMENT 1-293/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mrs FUILLET, Mr GLINN!, Mr JAQUET 1nd Mr SABY 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the situation of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico' . 
) 
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A. having regard to the precarious situation facing the Guate.alan 
citiztns who have taken refute on Mexican territory, 
B. 1w1rt of tht difficult aitultion of the rtfugttl in Mexico, wholt 
nUMbtrl ert incrttlint and ~ho ••Y hevt to rt•atn thtrt for 1 furthtr 
period of ti••~ 
c. having regard to the United Nations r!solution of 17 Dec .. ber 1982, 
D. having regard to the report by the Madrid Peoples' Tribunal of 
28 and 31 January 1983, 
e. having regard to th! resolution of 8 March 1983 by the United Nations 
Commission on Huaan Rights, 
F. having regard to the violation of hUMan rights in Guat .. ala, 
G. having regard to the 1951 Geneva Convention, 
H. having regtrd to the incursions by the Guat .. alan anay into refugee 
tiMPI on 26 and 31 Jenutry 1913 dtnounctd by Mr 'oul HARTLJNG, the High 
Commi11iontr for RtfUQttl, 
"' 1. .Calli on·.the G~i .. alan GovernHnt to reJPect ·the huun t..fahts and 
,,l'' ' I ' ' 
fUndaHrital ·fre,JO.a of ~e refugees; •· :·; .. ,.~ _.:;·· ,.! · ... · 
. ' . ~: : •, 
. ' 2~ iJCPr••••• its ciHp concern at the fate of the Guat.alan ref.ugees 
., 
. ·on "•xi can urritot)'; 
'· 
,. . ~ ~~. ,) f ' 
.. L condeltns the iftcursions by the Guate..lan •rW i~o ... teen territory, 
4. Welca.es the efforts of the huaanitarian organizations tn support of the 
aeasurts being taken by Mexico in this region; 
5. Requests the governMents of the M.-ber States to take •easures to assist 
the refugees, ensuring that their safety is guaranteed, and that they receive 
recognized refugee statijS for as long as Guateaall fails to respect hu.an righ 
6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the COMmission, the 
Council and the Foreign Ministers of the ten Coaaunity Me•ber States. 
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ANNEX IX 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1983-1984 
26 July 1983 DOCUMENT 1-620/f3 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mrs CLWYD 
~ursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the imprisonmemt of Ana Margarita Gasteazoro 
' 
(PE 85.943) 
EnsJish Edition 
- 68 :.. 
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The European Parliament, 
A. noting that Ana Margarita Gasteazoro a 32 year old teacher of English is 
still awaiting trial at the women's prison in Ilopango EL Salvador since 
12 May 1981, 
B. having regard to the violation of Articles 8 and 11 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, 
C. having regard to many reports of the repression of Human Rights in El Salvador, 
1. Reiterates its appeal for human rights to be respected throughout the world; 
2. Calls on the Government of El Salvador to take swift action to clear up the 
case of Ana Margarit~Gasteazoro by holding a fair civil trial conforming with 
national and international standards, or by granting her immediate and uncondit-
ional release; 
3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and to the 
President of El Salvador. 
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13 July 1983 
English Edition 
ANNEX X 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1983 - 1984 
DOCUMENT 1-567/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr van AERSSEN, Mr BARB!, Mr PEDINI, 
Mr LANGES, Mrs LENZ, Mrs LENTZ-CORNETTE, Mr Konrad SCHON, 
Mr NOTENBOOM and Mr LUCKER 
on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party 
<Christian-Democratic Group> 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on Nicaragua 
(PE 85.820) 
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A. concerned at the increasingly repressive measures taken by the 
Sandinist regime against the political opposition in Nicaragua; 
B. disturbed in particular at the persecution suffered by trade-
unionists of the Central de Trabajadores de Nicaragua (CTN), which 
is affiliated to the Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores, 
the largest Latin American trade-union movement; 
c. shocked at the fact that in May 1983, 18 members of the CTN were 
in prison for having done no more than defend the rights of workers 
in Nicaragua; 
1. Condemns all repressive measures against the political opposition, 
and in particular against free trade unions, in Nicaragua; 
2. Calls for the immediate release of all political prisoners; 
3. Insiststhat the trade unions be allowed to perform their legitimate 
function without state interference; 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, 
the Commission, the Latin-American Parliament and the Government 
of Nicaragua. 
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English Edition 
ANNEX XI 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1983-1984 
DOCUMENT 1-731/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr PEDINI, Mr BARBI, Mr LANGES and Mrs LENZ 
on behalf of the Group of the European People' Party 
<CD Group> 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the situation in Central America 
. - 72 - (PE 86.539) 
PE 89.121/fin~iAnn.XI 
The European Parliament, 
A- concerned at the continuing and deepening political crisis in Central America 
which by breeding violence is augmenting the suffering of the peoples of the 
area, leading to repeated disregard for human and democratic rights and increasing 
the dangers to world peace, 
8- having regard to its previous resolutions on this matter, 
C- having regard to the Wiescorek-Zeul and Van Aerssen reports on Central America 
and Latin America, 
D- having regard to the final resolution of the VIth Conference in Brussels between 
the European Parliament and the Latin American Parliament and the section 
devoted to the crisis in Central America, 
E- having noted with confidence the efforts made by the so-called Contadora Group 
and the OAS for a peaceful and regional solution to the disputes underlying 
the crisis and the practical initiatives under review in other national and 
international organizations, 
F - having noted the anxious recommendations put forward by the international 
movements of the major European democratic parties, 
G - having noted with interest that the United States Congress, prompted by domestic 
public opinion, has instructed a bipartisan committee to monitor the situation 
in Central America, 
H- convinced that all the forces working to bring peace to Central America should 
unite their efforts, 
I - convinced that a freeze on all arms supplies and the withdrawal of military 
technicians are essential but that in the interests of peace it is important 
to persuade all the contending nations to participate in open negotiations and 
to agree to free elections on an internal political basis involving all the 
political forces as a move towards the establishment of normal democratic 
conditions, 
PE R9.121/fin./Ann.XI 
- 73 -
J- convinced that the state of extreme poverty afflicting the peoples of Central 
America aggravated by the world economic recession is one of the reasons for 
the serious crisis, 
1. URGES the Council of Ministers of the EEC to support the attempt at mediation made 
by the Contadora Group, to work towards peaceful negotiations within all organiza-
tions and to step up the friendly and open discussions on this issue with the 
United States of America; 
2. URGES its delegation for relations with Spain, after requesting the views of the 
committees responsible, and its delegation for Latin America to arrange a debate 
on the issue with the participation of Spanish parliamentarians having regard to 
the initiatives contemplated by their government; 
3. URGES the Commission, in accordance with the suggestions contained in the document 
of the Vlth Interparliamentary Conference in Brussels, to plan further economic 
assistance and active cooperation for all the countries of Central America and to 
step up humanitarian aid to its peoples. 
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30 September 1983 
• 
English Edition 
ANNEX XII 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN· PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 
DOCUMENT 1-748/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr WEDEKIND, Mrs SCHLEICHER, Mr HABSBURG, 
Mr VON WOGAU and Mr K. SCHON 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the persecution of members of the religious community· 
known as the 'Assemblies of God' in Nicaragua • 
( PE 86.552 ) 
- 75 -
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A - whereas the internment of members of this religious community is a 
a flagrant violation of human rights and in particular of freedom 
of religion and creed; 
8 - having regard to the question by Mr von Habsburg on the persecution 
of Jews in Nicaragua (H-204/83); 
C -having regard to the special responsibility of the European Community 
to secure respect for human rights throughout the world; 
1. Condemns with the utmost vigour the internment of members of this 
religious community; 
2. Expresses its consternation at the fact that the persecution of the 
members of this religious community is not an isolated case; 
3. Is deeply concerned that members of this religious community have 
been tor.tur.ed, to' death; 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council 
and the Commission with a view to obtaining a joint condemnation 
of this case by the European institutions; 
5. Calls upon the Nicaraguan Government to release the persons interned 
forthwith. 
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ANNEX XIII 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1983-1984 
• 
9 January 1984 DOCUMENT 1-1257/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr GLINNE 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the threats to Nicaragua 
• 
English Edition - 77 - t PE 88. 445) · 
PE 89.121/fin./Ann.XIII 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
- concerned at the threats fadnt Nicaragua, partict-uharly: 
<A> the attempts bei,. ..... t& ose- the 'food weapon' for purposes of 
destabil ization ~ e-xternal eppoAents of the leial govemment in Managua, 
(B) the recent military developments in the Caribbean and the ccmstant 
harassment atong t~ ~rd'ers with Nicaragua, 
1. states, therefore, the ComMunity's desire to contribute to the protection of 
the right of pe.Optes to self-determination free from all outside pressures; 
2. Expresses its cOf'H:ern at tM ex-terna-l and internal llletho4its used against the 
process of 1110vino towards de1110cracy bein9 carried out by the legal government'; 
3. Expresses its fear of any external intervention, w~rns against attempts to 
impose a solution b)' forte and wices its concern a~ to the eonsequences of 
ill-considered actions in express violation of the United Nations Charter; 
4. 11'\strt:Jth ih Jtrriidtftt t~ for~rd this. resoh:rtion. to the tobission, the 
Ceuncil of Mii'\isters leeHng in pOlitical e~ration and, for information, 
the GoV.rAment of Hieir*IWt. 
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·glish Edition 
·ANNEX XIV 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working _Documents 
1983-1984 
DOCUMENT 1-1464/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by ~r LANGES, Mrs LENZ, Mrs LENTZ-CORNETTE, 
Mr VANKERKHOVEN, Mr GEROKOSTOPOULOS and Mr VAN AERSSEN 
! 
p~r$uant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on t~e speech delivered by the President of the 
European Parliament to the Council of State of Nicaragua 
on 10 January 1984 in Managua 
- 79 -
(PE 89.241) 
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A. having regard to the speech delivered by its President to the Council 
of State of Nicaragua on 10 January 1984 in Managua; 
B. having regard to the European Parliament's resolutions Of 11 June 
1982 (Doe. 1-332/82) and 13 January 1983 (Doe. 1-1112'183)' on 
Nicaragua; 
C. having regard to the European Parliament's resolution of 16 November 
1983 on the deployment of missiles in Western Europe (Doe. 1-1014/83>; 
I. Affirms the position adopted by a large majority in the above-mentioned 
resoiiJtions; 
11. Welcomes its President's support for the Contadora peace ·init-iative 
taken by Colompia, Venezuela, Panama and Mexico and for an:extension 
of economic and development cooperation.with Central A$eric~ 
Ill. Is unable, however, to approve of other substantial sections of the 
speech and notes, in particular, the following: 
1. The President stated that 'Many have already noted with some 
satisfaction that the Nicaraguan Government- has beeh able to 
accept a major criticism by the opposition of the draft electoral 
law'. (Page 18 of the original English text). 
In fact, the Sandinist Government has not taken account of the 
fundamental reservations expressed by the democratic opposition 
alliance, the 'Coordinadora Democr,tica• 1• These primarily 
relate to Article 11 of the Preamble and other provi$ions.~f the 
political parties law, which restrict all parties to the 
principles of the 'Sandinist Revolution' without defining what 
these are, so that the general provisions of the election· 
-------------1 This includes the Partido Social Democrata <PSD), the Partido Social 
Cristiano <PSC>, the Partido Liberal Constit11cionalista <PLC), the 
Partido Conservador Dem6crata <PCD>, the s~ l-Democratic trade union, 
ORIT, the Confederaci6n de Unificacion Sindi~al (CUS), and the 
Christian-Socialist trade union, CLAT Central de T-rabajadores de 
Nicaragua <CTN>. 
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law will serve as an excuse for further interference with party pluralism 
by the Sandinist Government and hence threaten the free. ~haMter:'bf the 
elections announced for 1985. 
2. The President declared that 'We were particularly satisfied with the 
measures of clemency which were introduced for the Miskito popu~ation 
particularly as our Parliament, in fact, adopted a critical resolution on 
this subject a year ago on 13 January 1983', and he goes on to link the 
Miskitos' situation with the 'social and political problems of the 
indigenous populations' in Central ·America, the Andes and the Amazon 
region. (Page 21 of the English text>. 
This statement - which makes no reference to the European Parliament 
resolution of 17 June 1982 - minimizes the Sandinista persecutioneof the 
ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic minorities of Miskitos, Sumos and 
Ramas in Nicaragua. Over 1,000 Indians have been killed, their vili.ages 
destroyed and tens of thousands driven from their ancestral·hometands on 
the Atlantic coast to be fordbly resettled in camps in the i'iiterior. 
About 10X of the Miskito population has fled to Honduras. The amnesty 
', ... ; 
has not made amends for these human rights violations. 
3. At several points in his speech the President attacked the ~nited States 
with reference to Vietnam (page 3> and former US policy in Central 
America, under President Roosevelt for instance (page 16>, and_~ also 
stated that 'Eastern European countries have long seen their own political 
and economic ambitions subordinated to the Soviet Union's security 
concerns. The countries of Latin America, particular of this region, so 
close to the United States, have felt the overbeartng attitude of the 
United States •••• both superpowers are guilty of this partial a~proach 
to the problems of the world'. <Pages 14-15 of the English te~t,. 
It is disconcerting that the President places the United States and the 
Soviet Union on a par with one another. Furthermore, ther.e is virtually 
no mention of the general destabilizing role played by the Soviet Union 
and Cuba in Central America. 
4. The President stated that 'In Western Europe, where thanks to the twin 
concept of defence and d'tente we used to be able to co-exist reasonably 
well with both super powers, we are now left with defence alone.' This 
is followed by references to the d&ep divisions in Western Europe over 
the deployment of nuclear missiles. (Pages 6~7 of the English text). 
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It is unacceptable that hel't again the President presents the European 
Community as adopting an intermediate position between the United States 
and the Soviet Union <'to co-exist~'>, a view not shared by the majority 
of the European Parliament, and that his appraisal of the NATO twin-track 
decision failed to inform the Nicaraguan Council of State of the 
European Parliament's resolution of 16 November 1983 in support of this 
policy, which was adopted by a large majority. 
IV. Regrets its President's failure 
1. to convey unequivocally the European Parliament's disquiet at the 
situation with reg~rd to human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
Nicaragua, the forced pace of militarization in the country, the 
Sandinista contribution to destabilization of the reg~on and the 
repressive measures against the democratic opposition, the non-
Sandinista trade unions and the church and thereby de•onstrate the 
solidarity of the freely elected European Parliament with the 
oppressed democratic forces in Nicaragua;. 
2. to express his concern at the 'turbas',the organized bands of thugs 
that attempt to intimidate troublesome politicians, trade unionists and 
clergymen by me1ns of mental and physical terror; 
3. to make unequivoc~lly clear to the Sandinista Government that the 
European Parlia~ent regards the establishment of a pluralist system 
based on liberty ~nd the rule of law, freedom of the press and free 
elections as pre-conditions for an improvement and normalization in 
relations between the European Community and Nicaragua. 
V. Calls for the inclusion of this resolution and its President's speech in 
the report by the Political Affairs Committee on the situation in Central 
America. 
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ANNEX XV 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1 983- 1 9 8 4 
Document 1-1467/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr d'ORMESSON, Mrs LENZ and Mr PEDINI 
on behalf ot the Group of the European People's 
Party (Christian-Democratic Group) 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the situation in Central America 
based on information gathered by its delegation to 
COLOMBIA, NICARAGUA, HONDURAS and COSTA RICA 
(PE 89.244) 
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1. Declares its support for the action undertaken by the CONTADORA Group 
with a view to restoring civil peace wherever it is being disrupted in 
Central America, developing the economy and raising the standard of 
living in the Central American countries, 
2. In this context gratefully welcomes the joint efforts being made by 
COLOMBIA, VENEZUELA, MEXICO and PANAMA (the CONTADORA Group), 
3. Hopes that in coming years the EEC will grant sustantial aid to the 
CONTADORA economic programme, 
4. Notes with great interest the Nicaraguan Government's announced intention 
to hold democratic elections in February 1985, 
5. Points out that the organisation and free conduct of such elections will 
not be possible until the following requirements have been met: 
- the release of all political prisoners <2,974 in 1980, 885 in 1981, 
969 in 1982 and 1,169 in 1983), in accordance with the conclusions 
of the Standing Commission on Human Rights, 
- an explanation of what happened to all the people who have disappeared, 
including those summarily executed <337 in 1980, 121 in 1981, 149 in 
1982 and 222 in 1983>, according to information supplied by the same 
Commission, 
- the release of the MISKITOS Indians forcibly detained in the following 
7 so-called resettlement camps: 
STOTOMBAS 
SWASNINOLA 
SUMU HILA 
SANNILAYA 
COL UMBOS 
FRANS A SIRPEC 
SANHSA 
which are nothing more than concentration camps where, according to 
information we have received, mothers have been parted from their children, 
6. Requests that a committee of inquiry from the International Red Cross be 
admitted inside these camps, 
7. Requests, moreover, that press censorship be abolished and, to this effect, 
calls in particular for the 'PRENSA' newspaper to be supplied with enough 
paper to meet its needs and to be allowed to circulate freely, 
8. Likewise requests that government and opposition parties be granted the 
same amount of broadcasting time and freedom of speech on radio and 
television and that religious services be broadcast, 
9. Urge:. the Commission, until these requests have been met, to provide the 
aid ~ranted by Parliament to NICARAGUA solely through non-governmental 
bodies and to supervise closely how such ?;~ is channelled, 
10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of 
Ministers, the Commission and the governments of the States concerned. 
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1981- 1982 
·-----------------------------------------------------------
I December 1981 
• 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mrs WIECZOREK-ZEUL 
for entry in the register 
DOCUMENT 1-905/81 
pursuant to Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure 
on Nicaragua 
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The European Parliament, 
- reaffirming its support for the guaranteed right to self-~~rmination 
of all peoples, 
- extremely concerned by the USA's repeated threats of military 
intervention in Nicaragua, either directly or by means of a sea 
blockade, thereby violating Nicaragua's right to sel~&termination, 
1. Calls on the US Government to refrain from all military intervention 
in Central America and from its constant threat to send in the Rapid 
Deployment Force, and instead to make a positive political and 
economic contribution to the development in self-determination of 
the people in Central America and Nicaragua; 
2. Fears that these threats by the USA are a reaction to the dwindling 
influence of the military and the ruling junta in El Salvador and 
that the USA thus wants to regain its lost influence by military 
means; 
3. Points out that any form of direct intervention by the USA would 
discredit it politically, not only in Latin America and in Europe 
but throughout the world; 
4. Considers that relieving the Nicaraguan frontiers of the threat of 
attacks launched from Honduras or by the Rapid Deployment Force is a 
major precondition for relieving the Nicaraguan budget of the burden 
of military expenditure and for releasing appropriations for economic 
expansion; 
5. Calls on the EEC and the Member States to approach the responsible 
institutions with a view to ensuring that the debts which have 
burdened Nicaragua since the time of the Somoza regime need not be 
repaid directly but may be used to set up a fund for the internal 
development of Nicaragua, given that its economic difficulties lie 
at the source of its current internal conflicts and problems. 
6. Calls for further consideration of methods of relieving Nicaragua -
and other countries - of the burden of the rising oil costs; 
7. Calls on the Commission to increase economic aid to Nicaragua and 
thereby to ensure that democracy will have a chance in Nicaragua in 
future too; 
8. Instructs its President to forward this resoJution to the Council, the 
Commission and the Foreign Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation. 
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European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1982-1983 
DOCUMENT 1-271/82 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr LOMAS, Ms CLWYD, Mrs LIZIN, Mr BOYES, Mr CABORN, 
Mr BALFE, Mr van MINNEN, Mr MEGAHY and Mr SEAL 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
concerning Nicaragua 
(PE 78.996) 
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The European Parliament, 
A. notes its previous Resolution calling for support for Nicaragua; 
B. notes the efforts of the Nicaraguan Government and people, which they 
are making to re-build its economy, following the overthrow of the 
dictatorship of Somoza; 
c. notes the right of all countries to be able to pursue their policies free 
from interference and threats from other countries; 
D. notes the widespread reports in the British press that President Reagan • 
has authorised a S19 million plan to establish a force to operate from ~ 
Honduras and to make raids across the border into Nicaragua to attack • 
power stations and bridges, in an effort to de-stabilise Nicaragua's 
economy; 
Calls on the Council of Ministers and Member Governments to condemn this 
plan and to re-affirm the right of Nicaragua to pursue its internal policies 
free from outside interference. 
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